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Abstract
We study the convergence time of the best response dynamics in player-specific singleton
congestion games. It is well known that this dynamics can cycle, although from every state
a short sequence of best responses to a Nash equilibrium exists. Thus, the random best
response dynamics, which selects the next player to play a best response uniformly at random,
terminates in a Nash equilibrium with probability one. In this paper, we are interested in the
expected number of best responses until the random best response dynamics terminates.
As a first step towards this goal, we consider games in which each player can choose between
only two resources. These games have a natural representation as (multi-)graphs by identifying
nodes with resources and edges with players. For the class of games that can be represented
as trees, we show that the best-response dynamics cannot cycle and that it terminates after
O(n2) steps where n denotes the number of resources. For the class of games represented as
cycles, we show that the best response dynamics can cycle. However, we also show that the
random best response dynamics terminates after O(n2) steps in expectation.
Additionally, we conjecture that in general player-specific singleton congestion games there
exists no polynomial upper bound on the expected number of steps until the random best
response dynamics terminates. We support our conjecture by presenting a family of games for
which simulations indicate a super-polynomial convergence time.
∗Parts of the results presented here already appeared in the Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Stochastic
Algorithms, Foundations, and Applications (SAGA) in 2007 [1].
1 Introduction
We study the convergence time of the best response dynamics to pure Nash equilibria1 in player-
specific singleton congestion games. In such games, we are given a set of resources and a set of
players. Each player is equipped with a set of non-decreasing, player-specific delay functions which
measure the delay the player experiences from allocating a particular resource and sharing it with
a certain number of other players. A player’s goal is to allocate a single resource with minimum
delay given fixed choices of the other players. Milchtaich [12], who was the first to consider player-
specific singleton congestion games, proves that every such game possesses a Nash equilibrium
which can be computed efficiently. However, he also observes that these games are no potential
games [14], that is, the best response dynamics, in which players consecutively change to resources
with minimum delay, can cycle. This is in contrast to congestion games with common delay
functions in which all players sharing a resource observe the same delay. In the following, we refer
to congestion games with common delay functions as standard congestion games. Rosenthal [15],
who introduces standard congestion games, proves that they always admit a potential function
guaranteeing the existence of Nash equilibria and that the best response dynamics cannot cycle.
Ieong et al. [9] consider the convergence time of the best response dynamics to Nash equilibria in
standard singleton congestion games. They observe that the delay values can be replaced by their
ranks in the sorted list of theses values without affecting the best responses dynamics. By applying
Rosenthal’s potential functions to these new delay functions they observe that after at most n2m
best responses a Nash equilibrium is reached, where n equals the number of players and m the
number of resources. This result is independent of any assumption on the ordering according to
which players change their strategies.
Since the best response dynamics in player-specific singleton congestion games can cycle, we
propose to study random best response dynamics in such games. This approach is motivated by
the following observation due to Milchtaich [12]: From every state of a player-specific singleton
congestion game there exists a polynomially long sequence of best responses leading to a Nash
equilibrium. Thus, the random best response dynamics selecting the next player to play a best
response at random terminates with probability one after a finite number of steps. Milchtaich’s
analysis leaves open the question how long it takes until the random best response dynamics
terminates in expectation. In this paper, we address this question as we think that it is a natural
and interesting one. Currently, we are not able to analyze the convergence time in arbitrary
player-specific singleton congestion games. However, our experimental results support the following
conjecture.
Conjecture 1. There exist player-specific singleton congestion games in which the expected number
of steps until the random best response dynamics terminates is super-polynomial.
In order to gain insights into the random best response dynamics, we begin with very simple
yet interesting classes of games, and consider games in which each player chooses between only
two alternatives. These games can be represented as multi-graphs: each resource corresponds to a
node and each player to an edge. In the following, we call games that can be represented as graphs
with topology t player-specific congestion games on topology t. First, we consider games on trees
and circles.
We prove that player-specific congestion games on trees admit a potential function from which
we derive an upper bound of O(n2) on the maximum number of best responses until a Nash
equilibrium is reached. Note, that this result is independent of the initial state and any assumption
on the ordering according to which players change their strategies.
The result bases on the observation that one can replace the player-specific delay functions by
common delay functions without changing the players preferences. Thus, player-specific congestion
games on trees are isomorphic to standard congestion games on trees and we can apply the result
1In the following, the term Nash equilibrium always refers to a pure one.
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of Ieong et al. [9] to upper bound the convergence time. We proceed with player-specific congestion
games on circles, and show that these games are the simplest games in which the best response
dynamics can cycle. As we are only given four different delay values per player, we characterize
with respect to the ordering of these four values in which cases the best response dynamics can
cycle. We observe that only one such case exists. Finally, we analyze the convergence time of
the random best response dynamics in such games, and prove a bound of O(n2) on the expected
number of steps until the dynamics terminates. In order to prove this result we introduce the
notion of over- and overload tokens. An overload token indicates that a resource is shared by two
players, an underload token indicates that it is unused. We observe that the number of tokens
cannot increase, and that once in a while tokens get stuck or vanish.
Based on the insights gained by analyzing player-specific congestion games on circles we present
a family of games and conjecture that there exists no polynomial upper bound on the expected
time until the random best response dynamics terminates. Obviously, this depends on the initial
state, and so we implicitly assume that the initial configuration is chosen appropriately. Our
conjecture is motivated by a slightly different notion of over- and underload tokens. Now their
definition depends on the fact that every resource has a fixed congestion that it takes in every
Nash equilibrium. In contrast to games on circles we show that the number of over- and underload
tokens can also increase if the initial configuration is chosen appropriately. Intuitively one may
think of the number of tokens as a measure of derangement of order. In games on circles this
measure can only decrease whereas it can also increase in general games. We fail to give a rigorous
proof of a super-polynomial lower bound. However, we support our conjecture by empirical results
obtained from simulations.
1.1 Definitions and Notations
A player-specific singleton congestion game Γ is a tuple (N ,R, (Σi)i∈N , (dir)
i∈N
r∈R) where N denotes
the set of n players,R the set ofm resources, Σi ⊆ R the strategy space of player i, and dir : N→ N
a strictly increasing delay function associated with player i and resource r. In the following, we
assume that ties are broken arbitrarily. That is, for every pair of resources r1, r2 ∈ Σi and every
pair nr1 , nr2 ∈ N, d
i
r1(nr1) 6= d
i
r2(nr2). We denote by S = (r1, . . . , rn) the state of the game in
which player i allocates resource ri ∈ Σi. For a state S, we define the congestion nr(S) on resource
r by nr(S) = |{i | r = ri}|, that is, nr(S) equals the number of players sharing resource r in state
S. We assume that players act selfishly and wish to allocate resources minimizing their individual
delays. The delay of player i from allocating resource r in state S is given by dir(nr(S)). Given a
state S = (r1, . . . , rn), we call a resource r
∗ ∈ Σi \ {ri} a best response of player i to S if, for all
r′ ∈ Σi \{ri}, dir∗(nr∗(S)+1) ≤ d
i
r′(nr′(S)+1), and if d
i
r∗(nr∗(S)+1) ≤ d
i
ri(nri(S)). Furthermore,
we call ri a best response of player i to S if, for all r
′ ∈ Σi \ {ri}, d
i
ri(nri(S)) ≤ d
i
r′(nr′(S) + 1).
The standard solution concept in player-specific singleton congestion games are Nash equilibria. A
state S is a Nash equilibrium if for each player i the resource ri is a best response.
In this paper, we consider games that have natural representations as graphs. We assume that
each player chooses between only two resources. In this case, we can represent the resources as
the nodes of a graph and the players as the edges. If different players choose between the same
two resources, then the corresponding graph has multi-edges. The direction of an edge naturally
corresponds to the strategy the player currently plays.
In the following, we will sometime refer to standard singleton congestion games. Standard
singleton congestion games are defined in the same way as player-specific singleton congestion
games except that we are not given player-specific delay functions dir, r ∈ R, i ∈ N , but common
delay functions dr, r ∈ R. Ieong et al. [9] observe that in standard singleton congestion games one
can always replace the delay values dr(nr) with r ∈ R and 1 ≤ nr ≤ n by their ranks in the sorted
list of these values without affecting the players preferences in any state of the game. Note that this
approach is not restricted to standard singleton congestion games but also applies to player-specific
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singleton congestion games. That is, given a player-specific congestion game Γ, fix a player i and
consider a list of all delays dir(nr) with r ∈ R and 1 ≤ nr ≤ n. Assume that this list is sorted in a
non-decreasing order. For each resource r, we define an alternative player-specific delay function
d˜ir : N → N where, for each possible congestion nr, d˜
i
r(nr) equals the rank of the delay d
i
r(nr) in
the aforementioned list of all delays. Due to our assumptions on the delay functions, all ranks are
unique. In the following, we define the type of a player i by the ordering of the player-specific
delays dir(1), . . . , d
i
r(n) of the resources r ∈ Σi.
We define the transition graph TG(Γ) of a player-specific singleton congestion game Γ as the
graph that contains a vertex for every state of the game. Moreover, there is a directed edge labeled
with i from state S to state S′ if we obtain S′ from S by permitting player i to play a best response
in S.
We call the dynamics in which players iteratively play best responses the best response dynamics.
Furthermore, we use the term best response schedule to denote an algorithm that selects, given
a state S, the next player to play a best response. We assume that such a player is always
selected among those players who have an incentive to change their strategy. The convergence time
t(n,m) of a best response schedule is the maximum number of steps to reach a Nash equilibrium
in any game with n players and m resources and for any initial state. If the schedule selects
the next player to play a best response uniformly at random then t(n,m) refers to the maximum
expected convergence time. We use the term random best response dynamics to denote the resulting
dynamics. Additionally, we use the terms best response dynamics and best response schedule
interchangeably.
1.2 Related Work
We already mentioned that every player-specific singleton congestion game possesses a Nash equilib-
rium which can be computed efficiently. Moreover, we mentioned that such games are no potential
game, even though from every state there exists a polynomially long sequence of best responses
leading to a Nash equilibrium. These results are due to Milchtaich [12]. Milchtaich also observes
that player-specific network congestion games, i.e., games in which each player wants to allocate a
path in a network, do not possess Nash equilibria in general [13]. He proposes to characterize those
games with respect to their networks which always possess Nash equilibria. Such a characteriza-
tion should be independent of further assumptions on the delay functions. Ackermann, Ro¨glin, and
Vo¨cking [4] extend the results presented in [12] to player-specific matroid congestion games, and
prove that the matroid property is the maximal property with respect to the combinatorial struc-
ture of the players’ strategy spaces guaranteeing the existence of Nash equilibria. In such games,
the players’ strategy spaces are sets of bases of matroids over the resources. Gairing, Monien, and
Tiemann [7] consider player-specific singleton congestion games with linear delay functions without
offsets and prove among other results that such games are potential games.
A model closely related to player-specific congestion games are standard congestion games.
Rosenthal [15] proves that these games are potential games. Ieong et al. [9] address the convergence
time of the best responses dynamics in standard singleton congestion games. They show that the
best response dynamics converges quickly. Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar [6] show that in
general standard congestion games players do not convergence quickly. Their result holds especially
in the case of network congestion games, in which players seek to allocate paths in a network. Later,
Ackermann, Ro¨glin, and Vo¨cking [3] extended the result of Ieong et al. [9] to matroid congestion
games, and prove that the matroid property is the maximal property on the players’ strategy
spaces guaranteeing polynomial convergence time. Even-Dar et al. [5] consider the convergence
time in standard singleton congestion games with weighted players.
Another model which possesses similar properties as player-specific singleton congestion games
are two-sided markets. In these games, we are given a set of resources and a set of players, and
for every resource and every player a preference list of the elements of the other set. Given such a
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game, one seeks for a stable matching assigning players to resources such that there exists no pair
of player and resource that are not matched to each other but prefer each other to their current
matches. Gale and Shapely [8] prove that stable matchings always exist. Knuth [10] proposes to
study better or best response dynamics in such games and observes that they can cycle. However,
Roth and Vande Vate [16] observe that short better response paths to stable matchings always
exists. Ackermann et al. [2] follow this line of research and prove an exponential lower bound on
the expected time until the random better (best) response dynamics terminates.
2 Player-specific Congestion Games on Trees
In this section, we consider player-specific congestion games on trees. Note that in such games the
number of resources equals the number of players. First, we observe that one can always replace
the player-specific delay functions by common delay functions such that the players’ types are
preserved. Hence, we obtain a standard singleton congestion game, whose transition graph equals
the transition graph of the player-specific game. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. In every player-specific congestion game on a tree with n nodes, every best response
schedule terminates after at most 2n2 steps.
Proof. Let Γ be a player-specific congestion game Γ on a tree. In the following, we describe how
to replace the player-specific delay functions of Γ by common delay functions dr : N → N, r ∈ R,
with the following property: For every player i its type with respect to the player-specific delay
functions equals its type with respect to the standard delay functions. Remember that the types
completely describe the preferences of the players, and hence, the transition graph of Γ is not
affected by replacing the player-specific delay functions by common ones. Since the resulting game
is a standard singleton congestion game, Γ is a potential game and we can apply the result of Ieong
et al. [9] to upper bound the convergence time. Obviously, the same bound holds in Γ. Thus, by
applying the proof of the convergence time in standard singleton congestion game as presented
in [3], we conclude that every best response schedule for player-specific congestion games on trees
terminates after at most 2n2 steps.
We prove the theorem by induction on the number of players and describe how to construct a
sequence of player-specific congestion games Γ1, . . . ,Γn on trees with the following properties. Γ1
is obtained from Γ by removing the players 2 to n from the game. The set of resources in Γ0 is the
set of the two resources the first player is interested in. Now Γi is obtained from Γi−1 by adding
one player and one resource to Γi. The player and the resource is chosen in such a way that Γi
is a player-specific congestion game on a tree. That is, we choose a player i who is interested in
resource r of Γi−1, and add the additional resource r
′ the player is interested in to Γi.
Obviously Γ1, the player-specific congestion game with a single player and two resources, is a
standard congestion game. As induction hypothesis assume, that we already replaced the player-
specific delay functions in Γi−1 by common ones without affecting the players’ types. For ease of
notation let Γ∗i−1 be this game. In the following, we assume that for every resource r in Γ
∗
i its
delay functions is defined for all possible congestion values nr between 1 and n and not only for
the maximum number of players that are interested in r in Γ∗i .
Now given Γ∗i−1, we describe how to choose the delay functions dr of the resources in Γ
∗
i such
that the players in Γ∗i and Γi have the same types. The delay functions of the resources r that
belong to Γ∗i−1 are the same as in Γ
∗
i−1. Additionally, we assume that for every such resource r
and every congestion 1 < nr ≤ n, dr(nr)− dr(nr − 1) ≥ n. If this is not the case, then due to our
assumption that the delay functions are strictly increasing, we can scale all delays by a factor of n
in order to achieve the desired goal. Thus, it remains to choose a delay function of the additional
resource r′ that does not belong to Γ∗i−1. Since the gap between consecutive values of the delay
function dr is large enough, we can realize every type for the additional player by choosing the
delay function dr′ appropriately.
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Applying the result from [3] to the game Γ∗n directly implies the theorem.
3 Player-specific Congestion Games on Circles
In this section, we consider player-specific congestion games on circles. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that the resources are enumerated from 0, . . . , n − 1, and that they are ar-
ranged in increasing order clockwise. Furthermore, we assume w.l.o.g. that for every player i,
Σi = {ri, ri+1 mod n}. In the following, we call ri the 0- and ri+1 mod n the 1-strategy of player i.
Furthermore, we drop the mod n terms and assume that all indices are computed modulo n. Due
to our assumptions on the delay functions, there are six different types of players in such games:
diri(1) < d
i
ri(2) < d
i
ri+1(1) < d
i
ri+1(2) type 1
diri(1) < d
i
ri+1(1) < d
i
ri(2) < d
i
ri+1(2) type 2
diri(1) < d
i
ri+1(1) < d
i
ri+1(2) < d
i
ri(2) type 3
We call the three other types, which can be obtained by exchanging the identities of the
resources ri and ri+1 in the above inequalities, type 1
′, type 2′, and type 3′. Furthermore, we call
two players i and j consecutive, if they share a resource, that is, if j = i + 1 or i = j + 1. Given
a state S, we call two consecutive players synchronized, if both play the same strategy, that is, if
both either play their 0- or their 1-strategy. Moreover, we call a set of consecutive players i, . . . , j
synchronized if all players play the same strategy.
3.1 Cycles in the Transition Graphs and a Lower Bound
We present an infinite family of games possessing cycles in their transition graphs. From this
construction we derive a lower bound of Ω(n2) on the convergence time of the random best response
dynamics in player-specific congestion games on circles.
Consider a game on a circle with n players which are all of type 3. It is not difficult to verify
that this game possesses only two Nash equilibria: either all players play their 0-strategy or their
1-strategy. Consider now a state S with the following properties: In S we can partition the players
into two non-empty sets S0 and S1 of synchronized players. Players in S0 all play their 0-strategy,
whereas players in S1 all play their 1-strategy. Again, it is not difficult to verify that in every such
state there are exactly two players who have an incentive to change their strategies. From both
sets only the first player clockwise has an incentive to change its strategy. Thus, there exist cycles
in the transition graphs of these games. We obtain such a cycle by selecting players from the two
sets alternately, and letting them play best responses.
In order to prove a lower bound on the convergence time of the random best response dynamics,
observe that with probability 1/2 the total number of players playing their 0-strategy increases or
decreases by one whenever a player is selected uniformly at random. After the strategy change
either all players are synchronized, and therefore the random best response dynamics terminates,
or again we are in a state S′ with two sets of synchronized players. Observe now that this process
is isomorphic to a random walk on a line with nodes v0, . . . , vn. The node vi corresponds to the
fact that i players play their 0-strategy. As the expected time of a random walk on a line with
n+1 nodes to reach one of the two ends of the line is Θ(n2) if the walk starts in the middle of the
line [11], we obtain a lower bound of Ω(n2).
Corollary 3. There exists an infinite family of instances of player-specific congestion games on
circles with corresponding initial states such that the number of steps until the random best response
dynamics terminates is lower bounded by Ω(n2).
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3.2 An Upper Bound
In this section, we present an upper bound on the convergence time of the random best response
dynamics in player-specific congestion games on circles. We prove the following theorem which
matches the lower bound presented in Corollary 3.
Theorem 4. In every player-specific congestion game on a circle the random best response dy-
namics terminates after O(n2) steps in expectation.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. We characterize with respect to the types
of the players in which cases there are cycles in the transition graphs of such games. We show
that cycles only exist if all players are of type 3 or type 3′. We analyze the convergence time
of deterministic best response dynamics in games with acyclic transition graphs by developing a
general framework that allows to derive potential functions from which one can easily derive upper
bounds. Finally, we analyze the convergence time of the random best response dynamics in the
case of games with players of type 3 or type 3′.
3.2.1 The Impact of Type 1 Players
First, we investigate the impact of type 1 players on the existence of cycles in the transition graphs
and on the convergence time of the best response dynamics. We claim that games with at least
one player of type 1 do not possess cycles in their transition graphs. Intuitively, this is true since
every player of type 1 changes its strategy at most once, whereas in a cycle every player changes
its strategy at least twice.
Lemma 5. Let Γ be a player-specific congestion game on a circle. If there exists at least one
player of type 1 or 1′, then TG(Γ) is acyclic. Moreover, every best response schedule terminates
after at most 4n2 steps.
In order to prove Lemma 5, we first prove the following one.
Lemma 6. Let Γ be a player-specific congestion game on a circle whose transition graph contains
cycles. Then every player changes its strategy at least twice in every cycle of TG(Γ).
Proof. The fact that players being involved in the cycle change their strategy an even number of
times is obvious. Thus, it remains to show that every player changes its strategy. For contradiction,
assume that there exists a player i and a cycle in TG(Γ) such that player i does not change its
strategy on that cycle. In this case, we could remove the player from the game, and artificially
increase the congestion on the resource the player allocates by one. We would then obtain a
player-specific congestion game on a tree which cannot have a cycle in the transition graph due to
Theorem 2.
Next we prove Lemma 5 for type 1 players. The proof for type 1′ players is essentially the
same.
Proof of Lemma 5. Without loss of generality, let player 0 be of type 1. Then observe that player
0 will never play its 1-strategy again, once it played its 0-strategy. Thus, by Lemma 6, TG(Γ) is
acyclic.
In order to prove the convergence time, observe that if we fix player 0 to one of its strategies,
then we obtain a player-specific congestion game on a tree. Due to Theorem 2, the convergence
time of such games is upper bounded by 2n2. Furthermore, observe that the transition graphs of
these games are isomorphic to disjoint subgraphs of TG(Γ). The first subgraph contains all nodes
of TG(Γ) in which player 0 plays its 0-strategy, the second one contains all nodes in which player 0
plays its 1-strategy. Finally, as all edges between these two subgraph are directed from the second
one to the first one, and as the maximal length of any best response sequence in each of these
subgraphs is upper bounded by 2n2, the lemma follows.
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In the following, we will assume that there exists no player of type 1 or 1′, as otherwise we
could apply Lemma 5.
3.3 A Framework to Analyze the Convergence Time
In this section, we present a framework to analyze the convergence time of best response schedules
in player-specific congestion games on circles. Let Γ be a game such that there is no player of type
1 or 1′. First, we investigate whether there is a sufficient condition such that player i does not
want to change its strategy in a state S of Γ.
Observation 7. Suppose that player i is not of type 1 or 1′. Then if it is synchronized with the
players i− 1 and i+ 1 in S, it has no incentive to change its strategy.
In the following, we call a resource r overloaded in state S if two players share r. Additionally,
we call a resource r′ underloaded in state S if no player allocates r′. Obviously in every state
of Γ, the total number of overloaded resources equals the total number of underloaded resources.
From Observation 7, we conclude that in every state S only players who allocate a resource that
is currently overloaded or who could allocate a resource that is currently underloaded might have
an incentive to change their strategy.
Based on this observation, we now present a general framework to analyze the convergence time
of best response schedules. First, we introduce the notion of over- and underload tokens. Given an
arbitrary state S of Γ, we place an overload token on every overloaded resource. Additionally, we
place an underloaded token on every underloaded resource. Obviously over- and underload tokens
alternate on the circle. Furthermore, note that a legal placement of tokens uniquely determines
the strategies the players play. A placement of tokens is legal if no two tokens share a resource,
and if the tokens alternate on the circle.
In the following, we investigate in which directions tokens move if players play best responses.
Consider first a sequence of resources ri, . . . , rj and assume that players i, . . . , j − 1 are of the
same type t. Additionally, assume that an overload token is placed on resource rk, and that an
underload token is placed on resource rl with i < k < l < j. The scenario we consider is depicted
in Figure 1.
PSfrag replacements
overloaded underloaded
orientation of the players
ri rj
overload underload
type 2 anticlockwise clockwise
type 2′ clockwise anticlockwise
type 3 clockwise clockwise
type 3′ anticlockwise anticlockwise
Figure 1: In which directions do the tokens move?
Assume first, that the distance (number of edges) between the two tokens is at least two, i.e.,
|l − k| ≥ 2. In this case, each token can only move in one direction. The directions are uniquely
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determined by the type of the players. They can be derived from investigating, with respect to
the players’ type t, which players have incentives to change their strategy. The directions are
stated in Figure 1, too. Assume now that the distance between the two tokens is one. That is,
k = l− 1. Then, there exists a player who is interested in the over- and underloaded resource, and
who currently allocates the overloaded one. It is not difficult to verify that this player always has
an incentive to change its strategy. Note that this holds regardless of the player’s type since we
assumed that there are no players of type 1 and 1′. Observe that after the strategy change of this
player all players i, . . . , j − 1 are synchronized and therefore there exist no over- and underloaded
resources anymore. In the following, we call such an event a collision of tokens.
So far, we considered sequences of players of the same type and observed that there is a unique
direction in which tokens of the same kind move. In sequences with multiple types of players such
unique directions do not exist any longer, i.e., overload as well as underload tokens can move in
both directions. However, if two players of different types share a resource and if due to best
responses of both players an over- or underload token moves onto this resource, then the token
could stop there. In the following, we formalize this observation with respect to overload tokens
and introduce the notion of termination points.
Definition 8. We call a resource ri a termination point of an overload token if the following
conditions are satisfied.
1. The players i− 1 and i have different types. Let these types be ti−1 and ti.
2. In sets of consecutive players of type ti−1 overload tokens move clockwise, whereas they move
anticlockwise in sets of consecutive players of type ti.
We illustrate the definition in Figure 2(a). Let player i − 1 be of type 3, and let player i be
of type 2. In this case, the requirements of the definition are satisfied. Assume, that player i − 1
plays its 1-strategy and that it is synchronized with player i− 2. Additionally, assume that player
i plays its 0-strategy and that it is synchronized with player i + 1. Observe now that the token
cannot move as neither player i − 1 nor player i has an incentive to change its strategy. Suppose
now that initially all players along the path play their 0-strategy. Then an overload token that
moves from the left to the right along the path stops at ri. The token may only move on if one of
the two players is not synchronized with its neighbor any longer. In this case, this player always
has an incentive to change its strategy as it can allocate a resource that is currently underloaded.
Thus, an underload and an overload token collide. Additionally, if initially all players play their
1-strategy and an overload token moves from the right to the left along the path, we observe the
same phenomenon. The token cannot pass the resource ri unless it collides with an underload
token.
Note that the definition of a termination point can easily be adopted to underload tokens. A
list of all termination points is given in Figure 2(b). In the left column we present all termination
points for overload tokens, in the right one for underload tokens.
PSfrag replacements
type 2type 3
overloaded
ri
orientation of the players
(a) Example of a termination point
→→←← ←←→→
2′ 2 2 2′
3 3′ 3 3′
3 2 -
- 2 3′
- 3 2′
2′ 3′ -
(b) List of all termination points
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3.4 Analyzing the Convergence Time
In this section, we analyze the convergence time in player-specific congestion games on circles. We
distinguish between the following four cases.
Case 1: For both kinds of tokens there exists at least one termination point.
Case 2: Only for one kind of tokens there exists at least one termination point.
Case 3: There exist no termination points but over- and underload tokens move in opposite
directions.
Case 4: There exist no termination points and over- and underload tokens move in the same
direction.
In the first two cases, we present potential functions and prove that the transition graphs of
such games are acyclic and that every best response schedule terminates after O(n2) steps. In the
third case, we can do slightly better and prove an upper bound of O(n) on the convergence time.
In all cases one can easily construct matching lower bounds. Only in the fourth case deterministic
best response schedules can cycle. In this case, we prove that the random best response schedule
terminates after O(n2) steps in expectation.
Before we take a closer look at the different cases, we discuss which games with respect to their
players’ types belong to which case. Games only with players of type 2 and 2′ or only with players
of type 3 and 3′ belong to the first case. Additionally, some games with more than two types of
players belong to this case. The second case covers all games with at least three different kinds of
players which do not belong to the first case. Furthermore, it covers games with type 2 and type
3 players, with type 2′ and type 3′ players, type 2′ and type 3 players, and with type 2 and type
3′ players. Games with type 2 players only, or games with type 2′ players only belong to the third
case. Finally, games with type 3 players only and games with type 3′ players only belong to the
fourth case. These observations can easily be derived from Figure 2(b).
3.4.1 Case 1
Lemma 9. Let Γ be a player-specific congestion game on a circle with termination points for both
kinds of tokens. Then Γ is a potential game, and every best response schedule terminates after
O(n2) steps.
Proof. Let S be a state of Γ and consider the mapping that maps every token in S to the next
termination point lying in the direction in which the token moves. In the following, we define
d(t, S) as the distance of a token t in state S to its corresponding termination point. Obviously
d(t, S) ≤ n. Consider now the potential function φ(S) =
∑
token t d(t, S) and suppose that a player
plays a best response. Then either one token moves closer to its termination point or two tokens
collide. In both cases φ(S) decreases by at least 1. Thus, φ(S) strictly decreases if a player plays
a best response and therefore, TG(Γ) is acyclic. Moreover, as φ(S) is upper bounded by O(n2),
every best response schedule terminates after O(n2) steps.
3.4.2 Case 2
Lemma 10. Let Γ be a player-specific congestion game on a circle with termination points only
for one kind of token. Then Γ is a potential game, and every best response schedule terminates
after O(n2) steps.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that termination points only exist for overload tokens.
In this case, we define d(to, S) for every overload token to as in the proof of Lemma 9. For every
underload token tu we define d(tu, S) as follows. Let to be the first overload token lying in the
same direction as tu moves.
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1. If to moves in the opposite direction than tu, then we define d(tu, S) as the distance between
the two tokens. The distance of two tokens moving in opposite directions is defined as the
number of moves of these tokens until they collide.
2. If to moves in the same directions as tu then we define d(tu, S) as the distance between tu
and to plus the distance between to and the first termination point at which to has to stop.
Thus, d(tu, S) equals the maximum number of moves of these two tokens until they collide.
Observe, that for every underload token tu, d(tu, S) ≤ 2n. Consider, the potential function
φ : Σ1 × . . . × Σn → N × N with φ(S) = (φ1(S), φ2(S)), where φ1(S) equals the total number of
overload tokens in S and φ2(S) equals the sum of all d(t, S) for all under- and overload tokens.
Suppose now that a player plays a best response. Obviously if two tokens collide, then φ1(S)
decrease by one. Moreover, if there is no collision, then φ2(S) decreases. Note that in the first
case φ2 may increase. This may happen if, due to the collision, d(tu, S) of a remaining underload
token tu has to be recomputed as its associated overload token has been removed. The new value
is upper bounded by the sum of the old values of tu and the collided underload token plus 1. Now
consider the lexicographic ordering <φ of the states of Γ with respect to φ. Let S and S
′ be two
states of Γ. Then
S <φ S
′ ⇔
{
φ1(S) < φ1(S
′) or
φ1(S) = φ1(S
′) and φ2(S) < φ2(S
′) .
Observe that φ strictly decreases if a player plays a best response. Thus, TG(Γ) is acyclic. Addi-
tionally, observe that φ1 is upper bounded by n, and that φ2 is upper bounded by n
2. However,
as φ2 only increases by one when φ1 decreases, we conclude that every best response schedule
terminates after O(n2) steps.
3.4.3 Case 3
Lemma 11. Let Γ be a player-specific congestion game on a circle with no termination points in
which over- and underload tokens move in opposite directions. Then Γ is a potential game, and
every best response schedule terminates after O(n) steps.
Proof. Let S be a state of Γ and consider the one-to-one mapping that maps every overload token
to the next underload token lying in the direction in which the token moves. We define the distance
of such a pair of tokens as the maximum number of moves of these two tokens till they collide.
Suppose now that a player plays a best response. Then either the number of overload tokens
or the distance between one pair of tokens decreases by one. Consider now the potential function
φ : Σ → N× N with φ(S) = (φ1(S), φ2(S)), where φ1(S) equals the number of overload tokens in
S, and φ2(S) equals the sum of all distances of pairs of tokens. Observe now that in the case of a
best response, φ1 either decreases by 1 or remains unchanged. In the first case, φ2 may increase
by 1. This is true as tokens from different pairs may collide. However, this can happen at most n
times. If this happens, the remaining two tokens form a new pair whose distance equals the sum of
the distances of the previous pairs plus 1. In the second case, φ2 decreases by 1. Then by similar
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 10, we conclude that TG(Γ) is acyclic. Finally, observe that
φ1 is upper bounded by n. Moreover, φ2 is upper bounded by n, too. Finally, as φ2 only increases
by one when φ1 decreases, we conclude that every best response schedule terminates after O(n)
steps.
3.4.4 Case 4
In the following, we present a proof of the fourth case for players of type 3. By symmetry of the
types 3 and 3′, the same result holds for games with players of type 3′, too.
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Lemma 12. Let Γ be a player-specific congestion game on a circle in which all players are of type
3. Then the random best response schedule terminates after O(n2) steps in expectation.
Proof. In order to prove the lemma, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 13. In every state S of Γ the number of players who want to change from their 0- to their
1-strategy equals the number of players who want to change from their 1- to their 0-strategy.
Proof. In the following, we call a synchronized set of consecutive players maximal if the next
players to both ends of the set play different strategies than the synchronized players. Obviously
in every state S of Γ which is not an equilibrium the number of maximal synchronized sets of
players playing their 0-strategy equals the number of maximal synchronized sets of players playing
their 1-strategy.
We now prove that in every maximal synchronized set of consecutive players only the first
player clockwise has an incentive to change its strategy. Thus, in every maximal set, there is only
a single player who wants to change its strategy. Note that this suffices to prove the lemma.
First, consider a maximal, synchronized subset of consecutive players N ′ = {i, . . . j} which all
play their 0-strategy. Then player i − 1 plays its 1-strategy, and therefore the players i − 1 and i
share resource ri. In this case, player i can decrease its delay by changing to her 1-strategy. Other
players k ∈ N ′, k 6= i, do not have an incentive to change their strategy as this would increase
their delay.
Second, consider a maximal synchronized subset of consecutive players N ′ = {i, . . . j} which
all play their 1-strategy. Then player i − 1 plays its 0-strategy and therefore no player currently
allocates resource ri. Observe now that player imay decrease its delay by changing to its 0-strategy.
Again, all other players k ∈ N ′, k 6= i, do not have an incentive to change their strategy as this
would increase their delay. This is especially true for the last player, who currently allocates an
overloaded resource.
Consider now the random best response schedule activating an unsatisfied player uniformly at
random. From Lemma 13 we conclude that the total number of players playing their 0-strategy
increases or decreases by 1 with probability 1/2. Combining this with the observation that in a
Nash equilibrium all players play the same strategy, we conclude that the random best response
schedule is isomorphic to a random walk on a line with n + 1 vertices. Vertex vi corresponds to
the fact that i players play their 0-strategy. As the time of such a random walk to reach one of
the two ends of the line is O(n2), the lemma follows.
4 Player-specific Congestion Games on General Graphs
In this section, we consider player-specific congestion games on general graphs and present evidence
supporting Conjecture 1 by constructing a family of instances for which experimental results clearly
show a super-polynomial convergence time. Our analysis of player-specific congestion games on
circles is based on the notion of over- and underload tokens, and there is no straightforward
extension of this notion to player-specific singleton congestion games on general graphs. The
instances we construct have, however, the property that every resource has a fixed congestion that
is taken in every Nash equilibrium, and we can define tokens with respect to these congestions. To
be precise, if the congestion on a resource deviates by x from the equilibrium congestion, we place
x overload tokens in the case x > 0 and we place −x underload tokens in the case x < 0. Note
that for circles with type 3 players this definition coincides with the former definition of tokens.
The crucial property of games on circles with type 3 players leading to polynomial convergence
is that the number of tokens cannot increase. The instances we construct in this section are in some
sense similar to circles with type 3 players, but we attach additional gadgets to the nodes which
can occasionally increase the number of tokens. We start with a circle with n type 3 players and
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replace each edge by n parallel edges. This modification allows each node to store more than one
token of the same kind if the preferences of the players are adjusted accordingly. Other properties
are not affected by this modification, that is, over- and underload tokens still move in the same
direction with approximately the same speed and if an overload and an underload token meet,
they both vanish. Each time a node contains at least two tokens of the same kind, the gadget
attached to the node is triggered with constant probability. If a gadget is triggered, it can emit a
new pair of overload and underload token into the circle. Usually, this new pair is stored in the
gadget and only emitted after the triggering tokens have moved on a linear number of steps. The
new tokens are not emitted simultaneously but the second is usually only emitted after the first
one has moved on a linear number of steps in order to prevent the new tokens from canceling each
other out immediately.
Initially we introduce two overload tokens at node 0 and two underload tokens at node n/2. The
two overload tokens move independently through the circle starting at the same node. Typically
they meet a couple of times before they meet the underload tokens and vanish. The same is true
for the underload tokens as well, meaning that typically a couple of gadgets get triggered before the
initial tokens vanish. Hence, the number of tokens has a tendency to increase. Since the triggered
gadgets emit the stored tokens in a random order, the random process soon becomes unwieldy
and we fail to rigorously prove that it takes super-polynomial time in expectation until all tokens
vanish. This conjecture is, however, strongly supported by simulations.
4.1 Our Construction
Given n ∈ N we construct a player-specific congestion game Γn consisting of n gadgetsG0, . . . , Gn−1
as follows. In the following, the notion of a gadget differs from the notion used in the previous
discussion. Previously, we described how to attach gadgets to a circle in order to illustrate the
relation to games on circles. Next gadgets are arranged on a circle. A single gadget Gi is depicted
in Figure 2(c). It consists of 4 resources ri,0, . . . , ri,3 and 5n players. Each edge in the figure
represents n of them. The gadgets are arranged on a circle, such that for every i the resources ri,3
and ri+1,0 coincide. Thus, for every i, 6n players are interested in ri,0 and ri,3, and 2n players are
interested in ri,1 and ri,2.
For every player who chooses between the two resources ri,k and ri,l with l < k we call ri,l
the 0-strategy and ri,k the 1-strategy of that player. In the following, we refer by the term type j
player to a player represented by an edge ei,j . The player-specific delay functions are defined as
follows. All players of the same type j have the same functions for the two resources they choose
between. We define these functions in terms of a threshold t for their 0-strategies, meaning that
the 0-strategy is a best response if and only if the total number of other players allocating the
0-strategy resource is less or equal to the threshold t. Otherwise the 1-strategy is the best response.
The thresholds are defined as depicted in Figure 2(d).
PSfrag replacements
ei,0 ei,1
ei,2 ei,3
ei,4
ri,0
ri,1
ri,3
ri,2
(c) Gadget Gi
PSfrag replacements
type 0 t0 = 3n
type 1 t1 = n− 1
type 2 t2 = 3n− 2
type 3 t3 = n− 1
type 4 t4 = 3n− 1
(d) The player-specific delay func-
tions
Figure 2: The lower bound construction
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In the next sections, we prove that every resource has the same congestion in every Nash
equilibrium. We proceed with a description of how gadgets can generate new tokens. Finally, we
present results obtained from simulations.
4.2 Properties of Nash Equilibria
In order to simplify our proceeding discussion, we introduce the term cbi,j(S) ∈ N, b ∈ {0, 1}, to
denote the number of type j players in gadget i who play their b-strategy in state S. Furthermore,
we define ni,j(S) = nri,j (S). In the following, let S
∗ be a Nash equilibrium of Γn. For ease of
notation, we use cbi,j = c
b
i,j(S
∗) and ni,j = ni,j(S
∗). The following observation is true because S∗
is a Nash equilibrium.
Observation 14. Let j ∈ {1, 3} and b ∈ {0, 1}. Then for every 0 ≤ i < n the number of type
j-players playing their b-strategy in gadget Gi in S
∗ is uniquely determined by the number of type
j − 1 players playing their b-strategy in gadget Gi in S∗, i.e., cbi,j−1 = c
b
i,j.
Next, we prove that every resource has the same congestion in every Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 15. For every Nash equilibrium S∗ of Γn and every 0 ≤ i < n,
ni,0 = 3 · n and ni,1 = ni,2 = n .
Proof. First observe that for every gadget Gi, it holds
c0i,0 ≥ c
0
i,4 ≥ c
0
i,2 .
If the first inequality were not true, then there exist type 0 players in Gi playing their 1-strategy and
type 4 players playing their 0-strategy. However, since S∗ is a Nash equilibrium, all type 4 players
in Gi who play their 0-strategy are satisfied and thus ni,0 ≤ 3n. We observe that all type 0 players
currently playing their 1-strategy have an incentive to change their strategy. A similar argument
proves the second inequality. Essentially, the same arguments prove the following implications:
c0i,0 < n ⇒ c
0
i,4 = 0,
c0i,4 < n ⇒ c
0
i,2 = 0.
Now consider an arbitrary gadget Gi and let 3n− ki−1 be the number of players from gadget Gi−1
allocating resource ri,0. In the following, we discuss how the parameter ki−1 affects the choices
of the players in gadget Gi in the Nash equilibrium S
∗. We prove that the best responses of the
players in Gi are uniquely determined by the parameter ki−1. In order to do so, we distinguish 6
cases.
1. Case ki−1 = 0: All type 1, type 3, and type 4 players in gadget Gi−1 play their 1-strategy. Due
to Observation 14 we conclude that all type 0 and type 2 players in Gi−1 play their 1-strategy
as well, and therefore the congestion on ri−1,0 is at most 3n. In this case, however, all type
0 players in Gi−1 have an incentive to play a best response. We conclude that this case does
not appear in a Nash equilibrium.
2. Case 1 ≤ ki−1 < n: ki−1 + 1 type 0 and ki−1 + 1 type 1 players in Gi play their 0-strategy.
The remaining players in Gi play their 1-strategy. Thus ki = ki−1 + 1.
3. Case ki−1 = n: All type 0 and all type 1 players in Gi play their 0-strategy; all other players
in Gi play their 1-strategy. Thus ki = ki−1.
4. Case n < ki−1 ≤ 2n: All type 0 and all type 1 players in Gi play their 0-strategy. Additionally,
ki−1 − n type 4 players in Gi play their 0-strategy. The remaining players in Gi play their
1-strategy. Thus ki = ki−1.
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5. Case 2n < ki−1 < 3n: All type 0, all type 1 and all type 4 players in Gi play their 1-strategy.
Additionally, ki−1−2n−1 type 3 and ki−1−2n−1 type 4 players in Gi play their 0-strategy.
The remaining players in Gi play their 1-strategy. Thus ki = ki−1 − 1.
6. Case ki−1 = 3n: Similar arguments as in the first case show that this case does not appear in
a Nash equilibrium.
As an intermediate observation we conclude that the lemma is true if at least one gadget Gi
exists for which n ≤ ki ≤ 2n holds. In this case ki−1 = ki for every 1 ≤ i < n and the players play
the strategies as described above.
Next we take a closer look at the second and fifth case. We begin with the second one in which
1 ≤ ki−1 < n implies ki = ki−1 + 1 which implies ki+1 = ki−1 + 2 and so on until kj = n. In
this case we enter the third case which implies kj+1 = n and so on. Obviously this leads to a
contradiction since ki−1 < n. Thus, whenever there exists a gadget for which ki−1 < n holds, S
∗
is not a Nash equilibrium. Similar arguments show that the fifth case does not appear in a Nash
equilibrium either.
4.3 Generating New Tokens
Motivated by Lemma 15 we are now ready to introduce a new notion of tokens.
Definition 16. Let S be an arbitrary state of Γn and let n
∗
r be the congestion on a resource r
in every Nash equilibrium. Then, we place over- and underload on the resources according to the
following rules.
1. If nr(S) = n
∗
r + k, k ∈ N, then we place k overload tokens on r.
2. If nr(S) = n
∗
r − k, k ∈ N, then we place k underload tokens on r.
Next we describe how the number of overload and underload tokens can increase. This can
happen if there are either at least two overload or at least two underload tokens on ri,0. In the
following, we discuss the first case in detail. The second case in only depicted in Figure 5.
Consider a single gadget Gi as depicted in Figure 4(a). Numbers attached to resources cor-
respond to the number of tokens lying on them. Positive numbers indicate that overload tokens
are present, negative numbers indicate that underload tokens are present. Numbers a attached to
edges indicate that a players represented by that edge play their 0-strategy, whereas n− a players
play their 1-strategy.
Configuration 4(a): Initially, there are two overload tokens on ri,0. In this case, all type 0 and
all type 4 players have an incentive to change to their 1-strategies. All other players are
satisfied. With probability 2/3, given that a player from Gi is selected, a type 0 player is
selected and the configuration 4(b) is reached, in which there is one overload token on ri,0
and one on ri,1.
Configuration 4(b): All type 1 and all type 4 players have an incentive to change to their 1-
strategy. With probability 2/3 configuration 4(c) is reached in which there is one overload
token on ri,0 and one on ri,3.
Configuration 4(c): Still all type 4 players have an incentive to change to their 1-strategy. How-
ever, we assume that the overload token which currently lies on ri,0 moves on due to a best
response of a player in gadget Gi+1. In this case, configuration 4(d) is reached in which there
is still one overload token on ri,0. Additionally, one overload token is in gadget Gi+1.
Configuration 4(d): Again, all type 4 players have an incentive to change to their 1-strategy.
Now one of these players is selected and configuration 4(e) is reached in which there is one
overload token on ri,4.
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Configuration 4(e): In this configuration, the overload token on ri,4 can move to the next gadget.
Observe that this event is much more likely than the next one, in which the only type 0 player
playing its 1-strategy switches back to its 0-strategy. All other players are satisfied. If both
events take place configuration 4(f) is reached. Note, that in this case additional tokens are
generated. There is a new underload token on ri,1 and a new overload token on ri,0.
Configuration 4(f): Finally, all n−1 type 4 players playing their 0-strategy have an incentive to
change to their 1-strategy. Additionally, the only type 1 player playing its 1-strategy wants
to change back to its its 0-strategy.
4.4 Simulations
We simulated the random best response dynamics in games Γn and obtained the results shown in
Figure 3. On the x-axis we plotted the parameter n, on the y-axis the average number of best
responses until the random best response dynamics terminated. Observe that the y-axis is plotted
in log-scale. For every n ∈ {5, 10, . . . , 180, 185} we started the random best response dynamics
from the following initial configuration: all type 0 and all type 1 players play their 0-strategies; all
type 2 and all type 3 players play their 1-strategies. Additionally, n/2 type 4 players in the gadgets
G0, . . . , Gn/2−1 and n/2 + 2 type 4 players in the gadgets Gn/2, . . . , Gn−1 play their 1-strategy.
All other type 4 players play their 0-strategy. This initial configuration corresponds to placing two
overload tokens on r0,0 and two underload tokens on rn/2,0. For n ≤ 160 we took the average over
400 runs, and for larger n we took the average over 100 runs.
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Figure 3: Average number of best responses
Unfortunately, it does not seem feasible to simulate the best response dynamics for much larger
values of n. We believe, however, that the results in Figure 3 are a clear indication for a super-
polynomial, maybe even exponential, convergence time.
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(b) One overload token detours to
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(c) It continues on the upper path
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(d) . . . and moves to the next gad-
get.
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moves.
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(f) New tokens are generated.
Figure 4: The number of tokens increases along the upper path.
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(e) The second overload token
moves.
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(f) New tokens are generated.
Figure 5: The number of tokens increases along the lower path.
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